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Abstract
In this paper we examine the labor market e®ects of migration in
Germany on basis of a wage-setting curve. The wage-setting curve
relies on the assumption that wages respond to a change in the un-
employment rate, albeit imperfectly. This allows one to derive the
wage and employment e®ects of migration simultaneously in a gen-
eral equilibrium framework. Using administrative micro data we ¯nd
that the elasticity of the wage-setting curve is particularly high for
young workers and workers with an university degree, while it is low
for older workers and workers with a vocational degree. The wage and
employment e®ects of migration are moderate: a 1 percent increase in
the German labor force through immigration increases the aggregate
unemployment rate by less than 0.1 percentage points and reduces
average wages by 0.1 percent in the short run. While native workers
bene¯t from increased wages and lower unemployment, foreign work-
ers are adversely a®ected.
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11 Introduction
High and increasing immigration rates in the US and Europe have fanned
fears that migrants reduce wages and limit employment opportunities of the
native labor force. Concerns that immigration increases unemployment are
particularly widespread in the continental European countries, where unem-
ployment is persistently high. In this paper we apply a wage-setting curve
approach to analyze the labor market e®ects of immigration. The wage-
setting curve relies on the assumption that wages respond to changes in
the unemployment rate, albeit imperfectly. This allows us to consider in-
stitutional and other labor market rigidities, which are particularly relevant
in the European context. In contrast to the overwhelming majority of the
empirical literature, which addresses the impact of migration on wages and
(un-)employment separately, we analyze the wage and employment e®ects of
migration simultaneously in a general equilibrium framework.
Following the seminal contributions of Borjas (2003) and Ottaviano and
Peri (2006), we employ a nested production function which assumes that
migrant and native workers within the same experience and education group
are imperfect substitutes. We moreover consider the imperfect adjustment
of capital stocks. Since it is likely that the bargaining power of workers and
employers varies in the di®erent segments of the labor market, we allow the
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Figure 1: Net migration rate per thousand, 1960-2005
2We apply this framework empirically to Germany, which is the third
most popular destination for migrants in the world after the US and Russia
(Freeman, 2006). With the fall of the Berlin wall, the net immigration rate
climbed in Western Germany from about zero at the beginning of the 1980s
to about 6 per thousand at the beginning of the 1990s, compared to 3 per
thousand in the ¯fteen member states of the then European Union (EU-
15) and 4 per thousand in the US (World Bank, 2007). However, since the
beginning of this millennium, the net immigration rate has dropped to less
than 3 per thousand in the course of Germany's economic downturn (Figure
1).
Our empirical analysis is based on a 2 percent random sample drawn
from the German social security records (IABS) for the period from 1980 to
2004. This data set allows us to identify the elasticities of the wage-setting
curve for education and experience groups and to estimate the elasticities of
substitution between di®erent types of labor in Western Germany.
We ¯nd an average elasticity of the wage-setting curve of -0.15 at the
national level, which is somewhat higher than the elasticities found in the
regional wage curve literature in other OECD countries (see Blanch°ower
and Oswald, 1994a; Card, 1995; Nijkamp and Poot, 2005), but substantially
higher than that found at the regional level in Germany (Baltagi, Blien,
and Wolf, 2007). However, the elasticities of the wage-setting curves °uc-
tuate considerably across skill groups and experience groups. The elasticity
between wages and unemployment is particularly large for highly educated
workers and workers with little work experience.
We simulate the immigration impact on the German labor market in three
scenarios: The ¯rst scenario analyzes the e®ects of a 1 percent immigration
at the given skill and age structure of the foreign and native labor force.
The second scenario examines the impact of the actual labor immigration
during the total 1980-2004 period and the ¯nal scenario assesses the e®ects
of the main immigration shock on the German economy during the 1984-1993
subperiod.
At the given skill structure of the foreign workforce, a 1 percent increase
in labor supply through the immigration of foreigners increases the unem-
ployment rate by less than 0.1 percentage points in the short run, while it
remains almost stable in the long run. Average wages decline by 0.1 per-
cent in the short run, but remain una®ected after the adjustment of capital
stocks. While native workers tend to bene¯t from higher wages and lower
unemployment risks, wages of the foreign labor force decline by about 0.7
percent and the unemployment rate increases by about 0.4 percentage points
in the short run and by 0.1 percentage points in the long run.
Accordingly, the increase in the foreign labor supply during the period
31980-2004 has increased native wages by 0.2 percent while the wages of for-
eigners have fallen by 1.8 percent in the long run. The unemployment rate
of natives declines slightly, while that of the foreign labor force increases by
0.25 percentage points in the long run. At the aggregate level, the labor
market e®ects are almost neutral in the long run.
The major immigration shock before and after the fall of the Berlin wall is
accompanied by a 0.5 percent decline in aggregate wages, while the aggregate
unemployment rate increases by 0.4 percentage points in the short run. In the
long run, the wage e®ects of this labor supply shock are neutral, however,
while the unemployment rate increases slightly by 0.1 percentage points.
Natives tend to gain, while the foreign workforce loses substantially.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 reviews the
empirical literature on the wage and employment e®ects of immigration. Sec-
tion 3 outlines the model. Section 4 describes the dataset. Section 5 presents
the identi¯cation strategy and the estimation results for the elasticities of the
wage-setting curves, the capital stock adjustment, and the elasticities of the
production function. Section 6 simulates the employment and wage impact
of immigration on the German labor market. Finally, Section 7 concludes.
2 Review of the literature
The overwhelming share of the empirical literature uses the variance of for-
eigner shares across regions for the identi¯cation of the labor market e®ects
of immigration. In this literature, both the wage and employment e®ects
of immigration are small and seem to cluster around zero (see the surveys
and meta-studies by Friedberg and Hunt, 1995; Longhi, Nijkamp, and Poot,
2005, 2006). This spatial correlation approach may however yield spurious
results if migrants are not randomly distributed across locations. Moreover,
the adjustment of other labor or capital °ows may equilibrate the migration
e®ects across regions. This literature therefore either relies on natural exper-
iments (e.g. Card, 1990; Carrington and DeLima, 1996; Hunt, 1992) or uses
instrumental variable estimators to correct for the endogeneity of locational
choices of migrants (e.g. Haisken-DeNew and Zimmermann, 1995; MÄ uhleisen
and Zimmermann, 1994; Ottaviano and Peri, 2005a,b; Pischke and Velling,
1997). It nevertheless remains controversial whether the wage and employ-
ment e®ects of migration can be properly identi¯ed by spatial correlations
between migration shares and labor market outcomes.1
1See Card (2001), Borjas, Freemann, and Katz (1997) and Borjas (2003) for controver-
sial arguments and evidence.
4The spatial correlation approach has been challenged in an in°uential
paper by Borjas (2003), which exploits the variance of the foreigner share
across education and experience groups at the national level to identify the
wage e®ects of migration. Under the assumption that the education and
experience characteristics of the migrant workforce are exogenous, this al-
lows an unbiased estimation of the labor market e®ects of migration. Borjas
(2003) measures the elasticities between wages and labor supply shocks in
the di®erent education and experience cells of the US labor market and ¯nds
an elasticity of between -0.3 and -0.4. Aydemir and Borjas (2007) obtain the
same elasticities for Canada and Mexico. Based on a similar approach, Bonin
(2005), however, estimates that immigration of 1 percent reduces wages by
less than 0.1 percent in Germany.
Ottaviano and Peri (2006), however, obtain results in a national-level
framework that support those of the spatial-correlation studies. Employing
a similar dataset as Borjas (2003), they ¯nd that immigration has increased
native wages on average in the US, while wages of foreigners have tended to
decline substantially. Two aspects set their approach apart from the Bor-
jas (2003) study: ¯rst, they provide evidence that native and foreign workers
within the same education and experience cell of the labor market are imper-
fect substitutes, while Borjas (2003) assumes perfect substitutionality. In a
recent paper, however, Borjas, Grogger, and Hanson (2008) argue that these
¯ndings depend on the de¯nition of skill groups and are therefore not robust.2
Second, they consider the adjustment of capital stocks, while Borjas (2003)
treats the physical capital stock as ¯xed { in line with the overwhelming
majority of the literature.3 Ottaviano and Peri (2006) ¯nd that a one per-
cent increase of the labor force through immigration increases native wages
by 0.06 percent under the assumption of a ¯xed capital stock and by 0.16
percent under the assumption of complete capital stock adjustment, while
the wages of the foreign-born workforce decline by about 2.1 percent in the
short run and by about 1.8 percent in the long run.
Borjas (2003) and Ottaviano and Peri (2006) focus on wages and rely
implicitly on the assumption of clearing labor markets. The application of
this approach is particularly questionable in the case of economies that are
characterized by wage rigidities and involuntary unemployment. There exists
a large literature that analyzes the e®ects of migration on employment op-
2Aydemir and Borjas (2007), moreover, could not replicate the results by Ottaviano
and Peri (2006). Based on another classi¯cation of education groups, they found that
native and foreign workers are perfect substitutes in the US and Canadian labor markets,
con¯rming earlier results by Jaeger (1996) for the US.
3Aydemir and Borjas (2007) relax this assumption by applying a similar approach to
Ottaviano and Peri (2006) for the adjustment of the capital stock.
5portunities of natives (see Bonin, 2005; Borjas, Grogger, and Hanson, 2006;
Hatizius, 1994; MÄ uhleisen and Zimmermann, 1994; Pischke and Velling, 1997;
Longhi, Nijkamp, and Poot, 2006, for a meta-analysis). This literature treats
the wage and employment e®ects of migration separately, however, ignoring
the interactions between wage rigidities and the employment e®ects of mi-
gration.4
This is the aspect in which the present paper contributes to the state
of the literature. We address the labor market e®ects of migration in a
framework where wages and employment are simultaneously determined. We
assume that an equilibrium relationship exists between the wage level and the
unemployment rate following the wage-setting models by Lindbeck (1993),
Layard and Nickell (1986) and others. This sets the wage-setting curve apart
from the Phillips (1958) curve, which relates the growth rate of wages to
the unemployment rate and considers this relationship as a disequilibrium
phenomenon.5
We estimate the relationship between wage and unemployment rates at
the national level.6 This distinguishes our approach from the 'wage curve'
literature (Blanch°ower and Oswald, 1994a, 1995), which uses the variance
across regions for the identi¯cation of the relation between wage and unem-
ployment rates. The main motivation for measuring a wage-setting curve at
the national level is that we are interested in the macroeconomic relation-
ship between wages and unemployment, which is inter alia a®ected by labor
market institutions such as centralized wage setting. This macroeconomic
relationship cannot be identi¯ed properly in regressions that use the regional
variance of the wage and unemployment rates and include time-speci¯c and
regional-speci¯c ¯xed e®ects. Consequently, we expect that regional and
national-level studies ¯nd di®erent elasticities between wage and unemploy-
ment rates. Indeed, we obtain an elasticity of the wage-setting curve at the
national level for Germany which is substantially larger than that found for
the wage curve in a recent regional-level study employing a similar data set
(Baltagi, Blien, and Wolf, 2007).
D'Amuri, Ottaviano, and Peri (2008) and Felbermayr, Geis, and Kohler
4The Borjas, Grogger, and Hanson (2006) paper, which considers the impact of wages
on the decision to participate in labor markets and in criminal activities, may be regarded
as an exception in this context, although it still assumes that wages are perfectly °exible.
5Bentolila, Dolado, and Jimeno (2007) examine the e®ects of immigration in a Phillips
curve framework. This paper addresses the question of whether immigration has changed
the slope of the Phillips curve in Spain, while we assume { based on the existing empirical
evidence { that the slope of the wage-setting curve is rather stable over time.
6For national-level estimates of this relationship, see the seminal paper by Sargan (1964)
and for a recent contribution, e.g., Guichard and La®argue (2000). The US evidence at
the national level has been summarized by Card (1995).
6(2008) recently applied the Ottaviano and Peri (2006) approach to the analy-
sis of the labor market impact of immigration in Germany. Like the present
paper, both highlight the importance of wage rigidities for an assessment
of the labor market e®ects of migration. However, the empirical framework
of these papers follows the standard approach of the existing literature in
estimating separate employment equations, while we apply a structural ap-
proach that determines employment and wages simultaneously in a general
equilibrium framework.
3 Theoretical background
The model presented here builds on Boeri and BrÄ ucker (2005) and Levine
(1999) in deriving the wage and employment e®ects of migration from a wage-
setting curve. While these papers focus on the aggregate e®ects of migration,
ours groups the labor force by education, experience, and nationality. Similar
to Borjas (2003) and Ottaviano and Peri (2006), we follow Card and Lemieux
(2001) in employing a nested CES production function for this purpose.
One can base the wage-setting curve on di®erent theoretical foundations
(see Blanchard, 2003; Blanch°ower and Oswald, 1994a; Layard, Nickell, and
Jackman, 1991, for a discussion). In our context, two modeling traditions
are particularly important. First, a wage-setting curve can be derived from
bargaining models (see e.g. Lindbeck, 1993; Layard and Nickell, 1986). Sup-
pose that wages are ¯xed in a bilateral bargaining monopoly between trade
unions and employer federations. Once wages are ¯xed, ¯rms hire workers
until the marginal product of labor equals the wage rate. If unions are con-
cerned about both their employed and unemployed members, the negotiated
wage is lower when unemployment is higher and vice versa.
Second, in a completely non-unionized environment, the wage-setting
curve can be explained by e±ciency wage considerations (Shapiro and
Stiglitz, 1984), where the productivity of workers is linked to the wage level.
Unemployment works here as disciplining device since it determines the dif-
¯culties in ¯nding a new job. As a result, ¯rms will reduce workers' pay if
the unemployment rate is increasing since they can achieve the same level of
productivity at a lower wage.
Both approaches have in common that they replace the conventional labor
supply curve with a wage-setting function, and that they rely on standard
assumptions about labor demand (Blanch°ower and Oswald, 1995; Layard
and Nickell, 1986). However, di®erent conclusions regarding the shape of the
wage-setting curve emerge from these di®erent theoretical foundations: on
the one hand, the bargaining model predicts a °atter wage-setting curve in
7labor market segments with a higher share of unionized workers. The share
of unionized workers is exceptionally high among workers with a vocational
training degree in Germany, i.e., workers with a medium skill level. On the
other hand, the e±ciency wage model expects a °atter wage-setting curve for
workers with a higher level of ¯rm-speci¯c human capital, since this drives a
wedge between productivity at the current employer and the outside oppor-
tunity wages, thereby allowing employers to smooth wages over the business
cycle (Card, 1995). Thus, it is likely that the wage-setting curve is °atter for
high-skilled workers since they tend to acquire greater levels of ¯rm-speci¯c
human capital.
In the following we do not rely on a speci¯c wage bargaining or e±ciency
wage model. Instead we take up a suggestion by Card (1995) and allow the
relationship between wages and the employment rate to vary for di®erent
groups in the labor force. This enables us to determine the wage-setting
curve empirically without imposing a priori restrictions on its shape from
theoretical considerations of one kind or another.
3.1 A structural approach to immigration and unem-
ployment
Suppose that the aggregate output of an economy is produced with di®er-
ent types of labor and physical capital. In general form, we can write the
aggregate production function as
Y = F (L;K); (1)
where Y denotes aggregate output, L a vector of di®erent types of labor
inputs, and K the capital stock. We assume that the production function
F(¢) exhibits constant returns to scale and positive and diminishing marginal
products with respect to each input, and satis¯es the Inada (1963)-conditions.
For the sake of convenience, we have skipped time subscripts.
We distinguish labor inputs by education, experience, and nationality.
Wages and the demand for labor are determined sequentially. In the ¯rst
stage, wages are ¯xed. The elasticity of the wage with respect to the un-
employment rate may di®er in each cell of the labor market depending on
the bargaining power of the parties in the wage negotiations or the level of
speci¯c human capital. In the second stage, pro¯t-maximizing ¯rms hire
workers until the marginal product of labor equals the wage rate.
Writing the wage in each cell of the labor market as a function of the
8respective unemployment rate gives
wijk = Áijk(uijk); Á
0
ijk < 0; (2)
where wijk is the wage of a worker with education i, experience j and national
origin k, Áijk is a function that captures the response of the wage to the
unemployment rate. The unemployment rate uijk is de¯ned as




where Lijk and Nijk denote the employed workforce and the labor force,
respectively, of education i, experience j, and national origin k.
The condition that the wage rate in equation (2) equals the marginal
product of labor allows us to solve for the employment response to a change in
labor supply. Note that the marginal product of labor in a speci¯c education,
experience, and national origin cell of the labor market is a®ected by the
employment changes in all other cells of the labor market. Solving for the
employment response thus requires solving a system of equations for all other
cells of the labor market, which is determined by the wage-setting curves and
the production function. This system has to satisfy in each cell of the labor
market the implicit function
©ijk = wijk(L;K) ¡ Áijk(uijk) = 0; 8 ijk: (3)
Di®erentiating this system implicitly with respect to a marginal migration




























where dM is a scalar that captures the marginal immigration shock to the
economy, Á a vector of functions that determine as above the wage response
to the unemployment rate, and N a vector of the labor force in each cell of
the labor market. We assume that the capital stock may adjust to a labor
supply shock through migration, i.e., that dK
dM ¸ 0.
Finally, having solved for the employment response, it is straightforward














Equation (4) has an economic interpretation. Consider three cases: ¯rst,
9assume that labor markets are completely °exible, which requires that Á0
ijk !







i.e., the marginal employment response equals the marginal increase in the
labor force in each cell of the labor market. This case corresponds to the
textbook example of the impact of migration in an economy with clearing
labor markets and an inelastic supply of native labor (e.g. Wong, 1995, pp.
628-632).
Second, assume that labor markets are completely in°exible, i.e., that
Á0

















which equals zero if the capital stock does not adjust to the labor supply
shock. This case corresponds to the famous Harris and Todaro (1970) model.
Third, in the empirically relevant case, i.e., when 0 > Á0
ijk > ¡1, employ-
ment adjusts partially to a labor supply shock through migration, depending
on the elasticities of the wage-setting curve and the elasticities of substitution
as determined by the production function.
3.2 Outline of the empirical framework
For the empirical analysis, we have to impose more structure on the economy.
We follow Borjas (2003) and Ottaviano and Peri (2006) in assuming that the
production function can be approximated by nested CES technologies. The
aggregate workforce is decomposed in i = 1:::4 education groups, j = 1:::8
experience groups, and k = 1;2 nationality groups, which gives together with
physical capital 65 production factors. Although the nested CES function im-
poses some restrictions on the elasticities of substitution, it has the advantage
that it is parsimonious in the parameters. Note that a general speci¯cation
of the production technologies, such as the translog function, would require
estimating 2,016 di®erent parameters of the production function in our case.
Suppose that aggregate production in equation (1) can be represented by






where Yt denotes aggregate output, At total factor productivity, Lt the aggre-
10gate labor input, Kt physical capital, ® the income share of labor, and t the
time index. Assuming a constant elasticity of substitution across education












µit = 1; (7)
where Lit is an aggregate measure for the employed workforce with education
i, µit a skill-speci¯c productivity level, and ± > 0 a constant parameter which
determines the elasticity of substitution between labor of di®erent education
levels. We assume the productivity parameter µit to vary over time since
skill-biased technological progress might a®ect the productivity of various
types of labor in di®erent ways.












µij = 1; (8)
where Lijt denotes an aggregate measure for employed workers of skill group i
and experience group j, µijt a productivity parameter, and ½ > 0 a parameter
which determines the elasticity of substitution of labor with similar education
but di®erent experience.
Finally, the employment within each education and experience cell is given













µijk = 1; (9)
where Lijkt denotes workers of skill group i, experience group j, and national
origin k, µijk a productivity parameter, and ¾i a parameter which determines
the elasticity of substitution between native and foreign workers.
We allow ¾i to di®er across education groups, assuming that the elasticity
of substitution between native and foreign workers varies across education
groups given that the importance of language, culture, and other factors may
di®er by education.
Our a priori expectation is that workers within each experience group are
closer substitutes than those across skill groups, which implies that ½ > ±.
Whether foreign and native workers in each education and experience group
are imperfect substitutes is the subject of some controversy in the literature.
11We simply assume that ¾i ¸ 0, i.e., we do not base our empirical analysis on
an a priori assumption as to whether foreign and native workers are perfect
substitutes or not.
Assuming that the wage rate equals the marginal product of labor, and
choosing output as the numeraire good, we can derive from the production































where · denotes the capital-output ratio.
The interest rate is a function of the capital-output ratio, i.e., r = 1¡®
· .
Thus, the complete adjustment of the capital stock to an aggregate labor sup-
ply shock requires that the capital-output ratio remains constant. Note that
a constant capital-output ratio is predicted by neoclassical growth models
and one of the stylized facts about economic growth (Kaldor, 1961). Follow-
ing Ottaviano and Peri (2006) we assume that d·
dM · 0, which is examined
below.
The derivatives of equation (10) are used for ¯nding the partial derivatives
of the wage with respect to the labor supply changes in equation (4). For an
explicit solution of the employment response, see the Appendix.
Finally, having solved for the employment response we can express the








































































where sqnmt, sinmt, sijmt, sijt and sit denote the share of the wages paid to














m wqnmtLqnmt, and sit =
12change of the labor supply in each cell of the labor market as denoted by
the terms in brackets in equation (11) refers to the employment changes as
determined by equation (4). Finally, as before, the term d·t refers to the
change in the capital-output ratio triggered by immigration.
Note that we obtain a similar equation for the factor demand compared
to those found in the empirical literature since we assume that the wage rate
equals the marginal product of employed labor. Thus we can compare our
¯ndings regarding the wage e®ects of a marginal employment shock inter alia
with those of Borjas (2003) and Ottaviano and Peri (2006).
4 Data
4.1 Description of the dataset
In our empirical analysis we use the IAB Sample (IABS), a two percent
random sample of all German employees registered with the social secu-
rity system in the period 1975-2004. The IABS provides information on
socio-economic and job characteristics at the individual level. Supplemen-
tary information on bene¯t recipients is added to the sample. The IABS
is strati¯ed according to nationality and therefore representative for the na-
tive and foreign working population. Being of an administrative nature, the
IABS provides accurate longitudinal information on the employment and
unemployment histories of employees. The dataset is especially suitable for
performing analyses taking wages into account since the wage information is
used to calculate social security contributions and is therefore highly reliable.
Nevertheless the IABS has also some minor limitations in the context
of our analysis: the main shortcoming is that we can identify foreigners
only on the basis of citizenship. Some further limitations arise from the
wage and quali¯cation information provided by the dataset. This has several
implications:
First, there is no information on the year when immigrants entered the
country. Due to the jus sanguinis tradition of the German law, naturalization
rates have been traditionally very low, such that second and third generation
migrants often still have foreign citizenship and are therefore recorded as
foreign workers in our sample. On August 1, 1999, a new immigration act
came into e®ect that allows German-born children of foreign-born parents
living in Germany for at least eight years to decide up to the age of 23 which










13individuals whose parents possess a migrant background. Our data may
therefore su®er from a structural break.
To mitigate the possible e®ects of naturalizations, we have classi¯ed all
individuals as foreigners who are reported as foreign citizens in their ¯rst
available spell. This does not allow us to control for individuals who were
naturalized before entering the sample, but avoids naturalizations from being
displayed in our sample as a declining foreigner share.
Second, ethnic Germans { so-called "SpÄ ataussiedler" { are reported in the
dataset as Germans, since the concept of citizenship does not allow us to dis-
tinguish between home and foreign-born German citizens. However, special
bene¯ts have been o®ered to ethnic Germans, such as language courses and
other integration subsidies that should facilitate their labor market integra-
tion. These measures are reported in the bene¯t recipient ¯le added to our
dataset. This allows us to identify the majority of ethnic Germans who have
entered the German labor force since 1980. In our sample, the cumulative
in°ow of ethnic Germans achieves 3.2 percent of the labor force in Western
Germany (Table A1). Since ethnic Germans' labor market performance and
language command resembles that of other foreigners (see e.g. Bauer and
Zimmermann, 1997; Zimmermann, 1999), we have classi¯ed ethnic Germans
as members of the foreign labor force.
Third, the IABS covers only a part of the immigration surge from Eastern
Germany. The IABS included Eastern Germany for the ¯rst time in 1992. A
large part of the East-West migrants in Germany moved immediately after
the fall of the Berlin wall. This implies that more than one-third of the 2
million migrants who have moved from Eastern to Western Germany since
1989 are not covered by the dataset (Bundesamt, 2006). In addition, a large
number of East-West migrants moved to Western Germany before appearing
as employed or unemployed in the IABS, e.g., as students (Burda and Hunt,
2001; Hunt, 2006). The IABS thus not only understates the actual level of
East-West migration, it also distorts the skill distribution, since most of the
highly educated migrants move from Eastern to Western Germany before
their ¯rst employment spell (BrÄ ucker and TrÄ ubswetter, 2007).
For this reason, we decided to classify migrants from East Germany as
natives here and focus our analysis on Western Germany. Note that the
foreigner share is negligible in Eastern Germany. German reuni¯cation also
requires excluding Western Berlin, since mobility between Eastern and West-
ern Berlin has been high since the fall of the Berlin wall. Furthermore, local
employment o±ces in Berlin were pooled, which prevents us from distin-
guishing between unemployed workers in Western and Eastern Berlin since
reuni¯cation.
Fourth, the dataset reports gross daily wages and does not provide in-
14formation on the hours worked. We therefore exclude part-time employees,
marginal employees, trainees, interns, and at-home workers from the sample
since the wage information is not comparable for these groups. For the same
reason we exclude workers with wages below the social security contribution
threshold although they are coded as full-time workers. These workers are
likely to hold a "mini-job". Mini-jobs are attractive to workers because only
the employer, not the employee, has to pay social security contributions if
total earnings are below a legally de¯ned threshold, which is adjusted on a
sporadic basis (400 euros per month in 2007). There is no indication that
this creates a source of bias in the empirical analysis since foreigners are
proportionally represented in the respective groups.
Fifth, we restrict our analysis to individuals between the ages of 15 and
60. The reasons are that the statutory retirement age for females is the age
of 60, for males the age of 65. In addition, there is some empirical evidence of
di®erences in the early retirement behavior between German and immigrant
men (Bonin, Ra®elhÄ uschen, and Walliser, 2000).
Sixth, our data are right-censored since gross wages can only be observed
up to the social security contribution ceiling. About three percent of the
employment spells are censored. This may a®ect the estimation of the wage-
setting curves, particularly in the high-skilled segments of the labor market.
We have therefore imputed wages above the social security contribution ceil-
ing using a heteroscedastic single imputation approach speci¯cally developed
for the IABS data set (BÄ uttner and RÄ assler, 2007). The regression is run sep-
arately for each year and according to nationality for Western German em-
ployees. In addition we included the following variables: age, age squared,
six educational groups, industry codes, four variables for the occupational
status, and thirteen occupational variables, classifying the current position
held by the worker.
Seventh, self-employed workers and civil servants do not contribute to
the social security system and are therefore not covered by our sample. To
the best of our knowledge, there is no indication that foreign workers are
disproportionately self-employed compared to native workers. In the case
of civil servants, it seems plausible to assume that due to legal restrictions,
immigrants do not substitute natives.
Eighth, the employment history of individuals is interrupted if job-seekers
are not eligible for unemployment bene¯ts, unemployment assistance, or
maintenance allowances. This implies that individuals are considered to be
out of the labor force and are therefore not covered in the sample although
they might be looking for a job. From administrative data sources of the
Federal Employment Agency, we know that about 90 percent of the regis-
tered unemployed are eligible for bene¯ts. Therefore the unemployment rate
15is only slightly downwardly biased (Wagner and Jahn, 2004).
Ninth, the information on education is provided by the employers in the
IABS. This means that information on education levels is missing for about
17 percent of the individuals. Foreigners are disproportionately a®ected by
missing information on education levels. We therefore imputed the missing
information on education by employing the procedure developed by Fitzen-
berger, Osikominu, and VÄ olter (2005) for an earlier version of the IABS. In a
¯rst step, spells with valid and invalid educational information are identi¯ed
by classifying the reliability of employers' reporting behavior. In subsequent
steps, only valid educational information is used for extrapolation. This
procedure also allows us to correct inconsistent educational information on
individuals over time. After applying this imputation procedure, we had to
drop only 1.6 percent of the individuals because of missing or inconsistent
information on education.
Finally, education and work experience acquired in foreign countries may
not have the same value in the labor market as education and experience
obtained in Germany. Moreover, certain characteristics of foreigners, such as
their command of the German language, may prevent them from fully trans-
ferring their human capital to the German labor market. However, correcting
for the education and experience levels of foreigners by variables related to
their labor market performance in Germany involves an endogeneity prob-
lem. It may moreover bias our estimates of the elasticity of substitution
between native and foreign workers. We therefore employ the same rules for
the classi¯cation of education and experience groups for foreign and native
workers.
Following the model outlined in Section 3, we group the labor force by
education and potential work experience. A sensible classi¯cation following
the characteristics of the German labor market requires us to distinguish
four education groups: no vocational degree, vocational degree, high school
degree ("Abitur") with vocational degree, and university degree. At ¯rst
glance, one might consider aggregating the groups "vocational degree" and
"high school degree with vocational degree", but in Germany these are sep-
arate labor markets. Despite its small size, we therefore decided to treat the
group with high school degree separately. The group with a university de-
gree also covers individuals with a degree from a university of applied sciences
("Fachhochschule").
Furthermore, we distinguish eight potential work experience classes fol-
lowing the standard approach by Borjas (2003) in subtracting the typical
number of years spent in the educational system from the age of the worker,
and splitting the experience in intervals of ¯ve years. At the beginning of the
sample period, we have only a few observations in some education experience
16classes. Therefore, we exclude the 1975-1979 period and con¯ne our analysis
to individuals who where employed or unemployed on September 30 during
the period from 1980 to 2004 (Table A2).
4.2 Immigration trends and descriptive evidence
Figure 2 displays the share of foreigners { including ethnic Germans { in the
labor force and the share of foreigners in the employed workforce. During
the 1980s, we observe a sharp decline, which is a consequence of tightening
migration restrictions after the ¯rst and second oil price shock. The sharp
increase in the foreigner share during the 1990s is a result of the fall of
the Berlin wall and the civil wars in the former Yugoslavia, which triggered
large migration °ows into Germany. Note that the ethnic Germans who
contributed substantially to the increasing labor supply in the 1990s are
treated as foreigners. Since the beginning of the 2000s, the foreigner share
has plateaued as a consequence of the slowdown in economic growth and
tighter restrictions on immigration. Moreover, foreigners tend to be more
than proportionally a®ected by unemployment, such that their share in the
employed workforce declined relative to their share in the labor force during
the 1990s.
The foreign labor force increased dramatically during the ten year period
from 1984 to 1993 as a consequence of the fall of the Berlin wall and the
political and economic transition in Central and Eastern Europe. As Table
A3 demonstrates, the net increase of the foreign labor force amounts to about
4 percent of the total labor force during the total sample period, and to 5
percent during the 1984-1993 subperiod. We therefore simulate the e®ects
of this particular labor supply shock separately. Note that the education
groups have been a®ected very di®erently by immigration.
Table A4 presents the share of the foreign workforce by education and
experience classes. The foreign workforce is heavily concentrated in the group
with no vocational training. The foreigner share is also increasing in this low-
skilled segment of the labor market from 24 percent in 1980 to 39 percent in
2004. In the other educational groups, the foreigner share varies between 5
percent and 11 percent. In the high-skilled segment of the labor market, the
foreigner share fell from 7.1 percent in 1980 to 5.9 percent in the 1990s and
recovered in the early 2000s.
Tables A5 and A6 display the wage levels for natives and foreign workers
by education and experience groups. We report gross wages on a daily basis.
A consistent consumer price index for the observation period is not available.
We therefore employed the GDP de°ator for the de°ation of wages.
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Figure 2: Share of foreign labor force and workers
education groups. The wage levels of foreign workers are in all education
groups below those of the native labor force. While these di®erences are
fairly small in the education groups with no vocational degree, they are as
high as 20 percent in the other education groups.
5 Estimation
5.1 Wage curves
A large empirical literature estimates wage curves using the variance of wages
and unemployment rates across regions and branches (see Blanch°ower and
Oswald, 1994a, 1995; Card, 1995). Based on this approach Baltagi and Blien
(1998) have estimated the elasticity of the wage curve at about -0.07 for
Western Germany, which matches the average elasticity of about -0.08 found
in several OECD countries (see Nijkamp and Poot, 2005). However, in a
recent study for Germany, Baltagi, Blien, and Wolf (2007) estimate the long-
run elasticity between the wage and the unemployment rate at between -0.02
18and -0.03 employing a dynamic ¯xed e®ects model.
Based on the model outlined in Section 3, we deviate here from the stan-
dard approach by using the variance of wages and unemployment rates over
time and across education and experience groups for the identi¯cation of
the wage-setting curve instead of the variance across regions. Note that our
dataset contains 25 time-series observations that can be used for identi¯ca-
tion. Moreover, we specify the model in dynamic form following Blanchard
and Katz (1997), Blanch°ower and Oswald (2005) and Bell, Nickell, and
Quintini (2002) for the US and Baltagi, Blien, and Wolf (2007) for Germany.
This allows to disentangle the short-run and long-run wage and employment
e®ects of migration if labor markets do not respond instantaneously to labor
supply shocks.
More speci¯cally, we estimate the elasticity of the wage with respect to
the unemployment rate by experience and education groups as
lnwijt = ¯ij lnwij;t¡1 + ´ij lnuijt + °ij ¿ijt + eijt; (12)
where ´ denotes the elasticity between the wage and the unemployment rate
and ¿ a deterministic time trend. We consider a linear and a squared trend
here. The error term eijt is speci¯ed as a one-way error component model
with ¯xed e®ects for each education-experience group. Since unemployment
might be endogenous, we follow Blanch°ower and Oswald (2005) and Baltagi,
Blien, and Wolf (2007) and instrument the unemployment rate with the ¯rst,
second, and third lag of the unemployment rate.
The model is estimated separately for each education and experience cell.
In each regression we have pooled two experience groups together to achieve
more stable results. We have not distinguished between natives and foreign-
ers, assuming that the wage-setting mechanism provides equal wages in each
education-experience cell.
Table 1 about here
The estimation results are displayed in Table 1. All regressions have the
expected negative sign for the coe±cient on the unemployment rate. The
autoregressive parameter on the lagged wage is well below 1, supporting a
wage-setting curve rather than a Phillips curve. Moreover, in most regres-
sions, the short-run and the long-run elasticities between the wage and the
unemployment rate are highly signi¯cant. We obtain only insigni¯cant re-
sults in the group of workers with a high school degree and university degree
and the most extensive work experience, suggesting that the responsiveness
19of wages to the unemployment rate is close to zero in this segment of the
labor market.
The ¯rst regressions provide estimates of the wage-setting curve for all
groups and for each education group separately. In the regression where
all education-experience groups are pooled, we ¯nd a short-run elasticity of
about -0.08 and a long-run elasticity of about -0.15. This is somewhat higher
than the average elasticity of -0.1 found by the regional-level wage curve
literature in other OECD countries, but much higher than the elasticity of
-0.03 estimated by Baltagi, Blien, and Wolf (2007) at the regional level in
Germany.
Interestingly enough, the long-run elasticities are high at both ends of
the skill spectrum: in the labor market segment without a vocational degree,
we ¯nd a long-run elasticity of about -0.17, and in the high-skilled segment
of individuals with a university degree a long-run elasticity of -0.19. The
elasticity is particularly low in the segment with a vocational training degree,
i.e., the labor market segment with a high share of unionized workers.
Even more intriguing is our ¯nding of extremely high elasticities in seg-
ments with low work experience. Here we obtain long-run elasticities of
between -0.24 and -0.37. They decline monotonously with increasing work
experience in all cells of our sample and are particularly low in the labor
segment with work experience of more than 30 years. The results for the
1984-1993 subperiod do not di®er largely from the total period (Table A7).
We therefore base our simulations for the subperiod on the more stable pa-
rameter estimates for the total period.
The ¯xed e®ects speci¯cations reported in Table 1 are subject to the
Nickell (1981) bias of order 1=T. T = 23 in our sample. Monte Carlo sim-
ulations suggest that the coe±cients for the unemployment rate are slightly
overstated in samples of this time dimension. We have also employed the
Arellano and Bond (1991) GMM estimator for obtaining unbiased and con-
sistent results. The GMM estimates yield slightly lower results than the
standard ¯xed e®ects model, but are generally in line with the previous ¯nd-
ings (see Table A8). The overall elasticity is, at -0.09, lower than our ¯ndings,
but the elasticities for the individual education groups are comparable with
the IV-estimation results. Since the Sargan test statistics indicate that the
GMM model su®ers from overidenti¯cation, we use the standard IV-¯xed
e®ects estimation results for the simulation of the migration e®ects.
Altogether, our empirical ¯ndings support the hypothesis that wages re-
spond to an increase in the unemployment rate, and, hence, to labor supply
shocks.
205.2 Capital adjustment
The impact of migration on aggregate wages depends largely on the adjust-
ment of the capital stock. The Kaldor (1961) stylized facts on economic
growth suggest that the capital-output ratio remains constant over time,
indicating that capital stocks adjust to changes in labor supply.
The OECD data on capital stocks indeed demonstrate that the capital-
output ratio has increased only slightly from about 3.0 to 3.15 in Germany
during the four decades since 1960. Moreover, the °uctuations around the
long-run ratio of 3.1 are relatively small.
German uni¯cation involves a break in the time series on capital stocks.
For the calculation of the capital-output ratio we employ the net ¯xed capital
stock series provided by the OECD. Since the OECD reports only data on
the uni¯ed Germany from 1991 on, we use the share of Western Germany
in the gross ¯xed assets provided by the Statistical O±ces of the Federal
States for the calculation of the share of Western Germany in Germany's
total capital stock. This does not involve any visible break in the time series.
The unit root tests indicate that the capital output ratio and the labor
force follow di®erent stochastic processes over time. We can reject the hy-
pothesis of a unit root for the capital-output ratio at the 1 percent level if we
include only a constant, and at the 5 percent level if we include a constant
and a deterministic time trend. Thus, the capital output ratio seems to be
stationary. In contrast, the unit root test results suggest that the labor force
is a non-stationary variable which is integrated of ¯rst order. The levels of
the capital-output ratio and the labor force hence cannot form a long-run
equilibrium relationship. This may be interpreted as support for the Kaldor
(1961) facts.
For analyzing the short-run e®ects of labor supply shocks on the capital-
output ratio we estimate the following model:
ln·t = ¯0 +
s=Z X
s=1
°s ln·t¡s + ¯1¢lnNt + ¯2 ln¿t + "t; (13)
where ·t denotes, as above, the capital-output ratio, Nt the total labor force,
¿t a deterministic time trend, "t disturbances which are assumed to be white
noise, and s = 1;:::;Z an index for the autoregressive terms considered by
the model.
The number of autoregressive terms is determined by the Breusch-
Godfrey test for serial correlation. The test results suggest a second-order
autoregressive speci¯cation. We have moreover added a dummy variable that
controls for a structural break after German reuni¯cation, which is present
21in our data according to the Chow-breakpoint test.
Table 2 about here
The results are displayed in Table 2. In the simple OLS speci¯cation
we ¯nd a coe±cient on ¢ln(Nt) in the vicinity of about -0.7. A change of
the capital-output ratio of this size would be expected if the labor share in
national income is 0.7 and if physical capital remains ¯xed in the short run.
The sum of the coe±cients for the autoregressive terms suggest that adjust-
ment is fairly fast, i.e., that two-thirds of the labor supply shock disappears
within one year.
The simple OLS regression su®ers, however, from the endogeneity of labor
supply shocks. We therefore instrumented the labor force variable with the
¯rst and second lag of the population in Western Germany. In this case
the impact of labor supply shocks becomes insigni¯cant and shrinks to -0.2.
Although we cannot exclude that the actual impact of short-run labor supply
shocks on the capital-output ratio is zero, we use this value for the short-run
simulations, while we assume that labor supply shocks have no impact in the
long run.
5.3 Elasticity of substitution between natives and for-
eigners
The model outlined in Section 3 relies on the assumption that ¯rms hire
workers until the marginal product of workers equals the wage rate. This
allows us to identify the parameters of the production function analogously
to Borjas (2003) and Ottaviano and Peri (2006) by the elasticities of relative
labor demand.
Let us start with the identi¯cation of the elasticity of substitution be-
tween native and foreign workers. The relative demand of native and foreign
workers of education i and experience j can be expressed as




For identifying the ratio µijh=µijf, we employ dummy variables for each
education-experience cell. Conditional on these controls, we assume that
changes in the relative employment of natives and foreigners in each
education-experience cell are due to random shocks in the labor supply. We
22thus estimate the following regression to identify ¾i:
ln(wijht=wijft) = Dij ¡
1
¾i
ln(Lijht=Lijft) + ºijt; (14)
where the error term ºijt is a zero-mean random disturbance. In total we
have i £ j £ t = 800 observations. We estimate the equations by OLS and
weighted OLS using total employment in each cell as a weight.
Table 3 about here
The results are reported in Table 3. We ran the regressions separately
for the total period 1980-2004 and for the subperiod 1984-1993, when Ger-
many experienced a particular labor supply shock. In the total period, the
coe±cient for ¾i is signi¯cantly di®erent from zero in all regressions except
for the groups of workers with a university degree, providing support for the
hypothesis that native and foreign workers are imperfect substitutes in the
¯rst three education groups. However, the estimated coe±cients for 1/¾i are,
at between 0.05 and 0.07, relatively small. This indicates that the elasticity
of substitution between native and foreign workers lies between 15 and 20,
which is relatively high.
For the subperiod 1984-1993, we obtain very similar results, although
the estimated coe±cients are slightly larger and the standard errors slightly
higher.
These results contrast with the relatively low elasticities found by Otta-
viano and Peri (2006) for the US, but do not support the ¯nding that natives
and migrants are perfect substitutes (Aydemir and Borjas, 2007). The esti-
mates by D'Amuri, Ottaviano, and Peri (2008) for Germany are, at between
0.04-0.06, very close to ours. Similarly, Felbermayr, Geis, and Kohler (2008)
estimate this elasticity based on another dataset at between 0.07 and 0.1.
For the further analysis, we use the education-speci¯c estimates of the
parameter ¾i since the F-test rejects the null hypothesis that the coe±cients
are of equal size.
5.4 Elasticity of substitution between experience
groups
In the next step we estimate the elasticity of substitution between experience
groups. We ¯rst calculate the productivity-weighted labor composite Lijt.
23The estimates for the productivity parameters of native and foreign workers
can be derived from the estimated ¯xed e®ects as
^ µijh =
exp( ^ Dij)
1 + exp( ^ Dij)
; ^ µijf =
1
1 + exp( ^ Dij)
;
where we have used the restriction that the productivity terms add up to one.





































We identify the elasticity of substitution ½ by estimating
lnwijt = Dt + Dit + Dij ¡
1
½
ln ^ Lijt + Àijt; (15)
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lnLit and the education-experience
group ¯xed e®ects Dij for the productivity term lnµij, which is assumed to
be constant over time. This allows us to consistently estimate the parame-
ter ¡1
½ by 2SLS, where we use the log of employed native workers in each
experience-education group as an instrument.
Table 4 about here
We ¯nd an elasticity of substitution of about 30 in the regressions that
refer to the total period, which is substantially higher than the elasticity of
substitution of between 4 and 5, which Borjas (2003), Card and Lemieux
(2001) and Ottaviano and Peri (2006) obtain in their studies for the US.8
Interestingly enough, Felbermayr, Geis, and Kohler (2008) obtain similar
8In their recent study on Germany, D'Amuri, Ottaviano, and Peri (2008) do not provide
estimates for the elasticity of substitution across experience and education groups but use
the US estimates.
24elasticities for Germany to ours, although they employ another dataset for
their analysis. As a robustness check we have also assumed an in¯nite elas-
ticity of substitution between native and foreign workers in the calculation
of Lijt, which yields very similar results. In the subperiod 1984-1993 we es-
timate a coe±cient 0.064, which corresponds to an elasticity of substitution
in the vicinity of 16 (see Table 4).
5.5 Elasticity of substitution between education
groups
Analogously to the previous section, we use the estimated ¯xed e®ects ^ Dij




j exp( ^ Dij)
;
which in turn allows us to compute the estimated value of the productivity-



























which enables us to identify the parameter 1
± as
lnwit = Dt + Di + ¸i¿i ¡
1
±
ln ^ Lit + #it: (16)











± ln(Lt) and the education-speci¯c ¯xed e®ects Di and the education-speci¯c
deterministic time trend ¿i for the variance in the skill-speci¯c e±ciency
parameter µit. #it is assumed to be a zero-mean random disturbance. To
estimate the parameter ¡1
± consistently, we again employ the 2SLS estimator
and use the log of employed native workers within each education group as
an instrument for ln ^ Lit.
25Table 5 about here
We receive for 1=± an estimated parameter of about 0.15 in the total
sample period, which corresponds to an elasticity of substitution between
education groups of 6.5 (see Table 5). This elasticity is about twice as high as
the elasticities found in US studies (e.g. Katz and Murphy, 1992; Ottaviano
and Peri, 2006), but again matches the ¯ndings by Felbermayr, Geis, and
Kohler (2008) for Germany. As a robustness check we apply the assumption
that the elasticity ½ tends to in¯nity for the calculation of Lt, which yields
a similar elasticity of substitution. In the subperiod 1984-1993 we ¯nd an
elasticity of substitution of about 3, which is similar to the ¯ndings in the
US literature (Table 5).
Finally, the parameter ® has been calculated from the labor share in
national income, which yields an average value of 0.67.
6 Simulation results
We now use the estimated parameter values for the simulation of the impact
of migration on (un-)employment and wages. In each scenario, we distinguish
between the short-run and the long-run e®ects of migration. For the sim-
ulation of the short-run e®ects we employ the short-run coe±cients for the
elasticity ^ ´ij from the wage-setting curve estimates and the (small) negative
e®ect of an increase in the labor force on the capital-output ratio. The long-
run e®ects are calculated by using the long-run elasticities of the wage-setting
curve and by assuming that the capital-output ratio remains constant.
We simulate the following scenarios here. First, we simulate the e®ects
of a one percent increase of the labor force through immigration using the
average distribution of foreigners across the education-experience cells of the
labor market. This implies that the overwhelming majority of the increase
takes place in the education group of those with no vocational training, while
the increase in the other education groups is modest. This scenario provides
an indication as to the marginal e®ects of immigration at the given structure
of the workforce.
In the next step we simulate the wage and employment e®ects of immi-
gration for the total sample period, i.e., 1980-2004. We consider the actual
changes in each cell of the labor market here. Finally, we simulate the labor
market e®ects of the labor supply shock during the ten-year period 1984-1993.
The employment and wage e®ects are calculated for native and for-
eign workers for each education-experience group. For the aggregation, we
26weighted the wage changes by the income share in each cell, and the changes
in the unemployment rate by the share in the labor force in each cell. In the
tables, we report the average e®ects for the total labor force, the native labor
force, and the foreign labor force by educational levels.
A one percent immigration of workers with the same education and expe-
rience characteristics as the existing foreign workforce reduces average wages
by 0.1 percent and increases the average unemployment rate by less than 0.1
percentage points in the short run, while the long run impact is neutral. Par-
ticularly negatively a®ected are workers with no vocational training degree,
where the share of the foreign workforce is relatively high. The native work-
force is only slightly negatively a®ected in the short run and bene¯ts from
both increasing wages and declining unemployment in the long run. How-
ever, native workers lose slightly in the segment with no vocational degree.
In contrast, wages of foreign workers tend to decline by about 0.7 percent in
the short run and by 0.6 percent in the long run, while the unemployment
rate increases by 0.4 percentage points in the short run and by 0.1 percentage
points in the long run (Table 6).
Table 6 about here
The real labor supply shock during the 1980-2004 period changed the
structure of the foreign workforce. The total workforce increased by 4.1
percent through an increasing number of foreign workers, but the individual
education groups where a®ected in di®erent ways: The change in the foreign
labor supply increased the workforce with an university degree and { to a
lesser extent { with a vocational training degree more than proportionally,
while it reduced the labor supply in the group without a vocational degree
substantially. Particularly a®ected by the increasing foreign labor supply is
the rather small group with a high school degree (Table A3). Note that the
changing skill structure of the foreign workforce re°ect an overall trend of
increasing educational levels in the German workforce. As a consequence, the
foreigner share in the skill group without vocational training has increased
albeit the absolute number of foreigners has declined in this segment of the
labor market (Table A4).
Table 7 shows that the 1980-2004 foreign labor supply shock reduces av-
erage wages by a mere 0.4 percent in the short run. In the long run, average
wages remain stable due to the adjustment of capital stocks. The unemploy-
ment rate increases by less than 0.1 percentage points in the short run, and
stay almost stable in the long run. Particularly a®ected are the groups with
27a high school degree and a university degree, since the immigration shock
was large compared to the other groups here.
The wage impact of migration on the native labor force is almost neutral,
but natives tend to bene¯t by increasing wages and a slightly decreasing
unemployment rate in the short run. However, the rather small group with a
high school degree experiences a substantial, and the group with a university
degree a small loss in terms of lower wages and higher unemployment.
The foreign labor force su®ers from a substantial wage loss of about 2.3
percent in the short run and 1.8 percent in the long run. The unemployment
rate declines in the short run by about 0.1 percentage points, but increases
in the long run by 0.25 percentage points. Note that the unemployment
rate of foreign workers without a vocational degree declines substantially
by 3.3 percentage points in the short run, but this decline shrinks to 1.0
percentage points when wages adjust in the long run. As a consequence,
the reduced unemployment of less skilled foreigners is outpaced by higher
unemployment in the other education groups in the long run. Altogether,
wages of foreign workers are adversely a®ected by the increasing labor supply,
while the impact on unemployment is ambiguous due to the change in the
skill composition of the foreign workforce.
Table 7 about here
Finally, we simulated the e®ects of the immigration shock during the
1984-1993 period, i.e. the period which covers inter alia the fall of the Berlin
wall. In this period, the German labor force increased by about 5 percent
through immigration, which implies that the foreign workforce increased by
57 percent. Particularly a®ected was the group with a high school degree,
while workers without a vocational training degree were less than propor-
tionally a®ected by this labor supply shock.
The additional labor supply and changing skill composition of the for-
eign workforce reduced average wages by 0.5 percent in the ten year period
surrounding the fall of the Berlin wall, while the average unemployment rate
increases by 0.4 percentage points in the short run. Nevertheless, the wage
impact of migration is neutral in the long run, while the unemployment rate
increases by about 0.1 percentage points. Interestingly enough, the native
workforce tends to gain in terms of both higher wages (+ 0.3 percent) and
lower unemployment (-0.1 percentage points) in the long run, but su®ers
slightly from declining wages and higher unemployment in the short run.
The groups with no vocational degree and a high school degree tend to lose,
28while those with a vocational degree and a high school degree tend to bene-
¯t. In contrast, wages of the foreign labor force decline by almost 4 percent.
The unemployment rate of the foreign workforce increases by 1.6 percentage
points in the short run and by 1.4 percentage points in the long run. Par-
ticularly a®ected are the groups with a high school degree and a university
degree (Table 7).
7 Conclusions
In this paper we presented a general equilibrium framework that allowed
us to analyze the wage and employment e®ects of migration simultaneously.
We modeled wage rigidities in form of a wage-setting curve, which assumes
that wages respond imperfectly to an increase in the unemployment rate.
In the empirical application of the model we found that the elasticities of
the wage-setting curve di®er widely for the di®erent segments of the labor
market. While the elasticity of the wage with respect to the unemployment
rate is relatively high in the segments of the labor market with a university
degree and limited work experience, it is particularly low in the labor market
segment with a vocational degree and extensive work experience.
At the given structure of the foreign workforce, migration reduces average
wages and increases unemployment of the total workforce slightly in the short
run, while it is neutral in the long run. More interesting are the structural
e®ects: while native workers tend to bene¯t, the foreign workforce tends to
su®er from lower wages and increasing unemployment, at least in the short
run.
The analysis of the German immigration shock surrounding the fall of
the Berlin wall demonstrates that natives have su®ered from this immigra-
tion episode only in the short run if at all. In the long run they tend to
bene¯t both from higher wages and slightly declining unemployment. The
increase of the foreign workforce by almost 60 percent during the ten year
period surrounding the fall of the Berlin wall has however increased the un-
employment rate of the foreign workforce by about 1.5 percentage points
according to our simulations. This may have contributed to the increasing
unemployment risk of the foreigners compared to that of natives which can
be observed in Germany.
Our empirical analysis has produced a number of further intriguing re-
sults. Compared to the ¯ndings from the US studies, the elasticity of sub-
stitution between natives and foreigners is relatively high in Germany. This
implies that the labor market e®ects of migration are relatively similar for na-
tives and migrants within the same education and experience cells. However,
29native and foreign workers remain imperfect substitutes.
The elasticity of substitution across education groups is about twice as
high in Germany as in the US, and the elasticity of substitution across experi-
ence groups is substantially larger. As a consequence, the e®ects of migration
are more evenly distributed across the education and experience groups of
the labor market in Germany than in the US.
Finally, we found strong evidence that capital stocks adjust to labor sup-
ply shocks. We found no negative relationship between labor supply and
the capital-output ratio in the long run, and only small and insigni¯cant
e®ects for short-term supply shocks. This supports one of the famous styl-
ized facts on economic growth by Nicholas Kaldor (1961) and the evidence
that Ottaviano and Peri (2006) found for the US. This again has important
implications for the wage e®ects of migration: at least in the long run, an
increasing labor supply through migration does not reduce the average wage
level in the economy.
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35A Appendix
The general solution for the marginal employment response is given by equa-




























where we have used the de¯nition of ·. Using the nested structure of the






















































Note that we have from the nested structure of the production function





































































































@Lijk is the partial derivative of the wage with respect to labor in the
36same education, experience and nationality cell of the labor market,
@wijk
@Lijk0
the partial derivative of the wage with respect to labor of the same education
and experience, but di®erent nationality,
@wijk
@Lij0m the partial derivative of the
wage with respect to labor of the same education, but di®erent experience,
@wijk
@Li0nm the partial derivative of the wage with respect to labor of di®erent
education, and sijk, sij, si, etc. denote the share of wages paid to workers in
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Substituting (A.1) to (A.4) for the individual terms in equation (4) yields
the explicit solution for the employment response which we have used for our
simulation of the employment response to migration.
37Table 1: The wage-setting curve: IV-estimation results
lnwij;t¡1 lnuijt
education short-run long-run
degree coe®. se coe®. se coe®. se R2
all experience groups
all 0.480 (0.029) *** -0.077 (0.007) *** -0.148 (0.014) *** 0.88
no vocational 0.649 (0.050) *** -0.061 (0.007) *** -0.172 (0.031) *** 0.94
vocational 0.535 (0.052) *** -0.055 (0.007) *** -0.119 (0.019) *** 0.96
high school 0.508 (0.064) *** -0.081 (0.023) *** -0.164 (0.048) *** 0.82
university 0.356 (0.064) *** -0.120 (0.019) *** -0.186 (0.026) *** 0.86
experience group 1 and 2
no vocational 0.776 (0.102) *** -0.059 (0.013) *** -0.265 (0.142) * 0.820
vocational 0.778 (0.086) *** -0.053 (0.009) *** -0.238 (0.114) ** 0.980
high school 0.807 (0.110) *** -0.072 (0.018) *** -0.372 (0.266) 0.970
university 0.531 (0.100) *** -0.132 (0.020) *** -0.281 (0.067) *** 0.900
experience group 3 and 4
no vocational 0.464 (0.122) *** -0.104 (0.023) *** -0.194 (0.057) *** 0.950
vocational 0.303 (0.114) *** -0.092 (0.017) *** -0.132 (0.027) *** 0.960
high school 0.405 (0.143) *** -0.094 (0.050) * -0.159 (0.076) ** 0.930
university 0.481 (0.102) *** -0.138 (0.045) *** -0.266 (0.088) *** 0.890
experience group 5 and 6
no vocational 0.460 (0.111) *** -0.080 (0.018) *** -0.149 (0.033) *** 0.960
vocational 0.428 (0.124) *** -0.067 (0.020) *** -0.117 (0.030) *** 0.860
high school 0.507 (0.159) *** -0.122 (0.060) ** -0.247 (0.110) ** 0.500
university 0.316 (0.133) ** -0.094 (0.036) *** -0.137 (0.044) *** 0.820
experience group 7 and 8
no vocational 0.394 (0.115) *** -0.090 (0.019) *** -0.148 (0.024) *** 0.980
vocational 0.215 (0.147) -0.076 (0.019) *** -0.097 (0.021) *** 0.960
high school 0.412 (0.137) *** -0.069 (0.069) -0.117 (0.113) 0.430
university 0.290 (0.238) -0.081 (0.075) -0.114 (0.075) 0.850
Notes: Dependent variable is lnwijt, i.e. the log wage in each education-experience
group. White-heteroscedasticity robust standard errors in parentheses. ¤¤¤, ¤¤, ¤ de-
note the 1%-, 5%-, and 10%-signi¯cance levels. The model is estimated by 2SLS. The
unemployment rate is instrumented by its ¯rst, second and third lag. The model is
speci¯ed as a one-way error component model with group speci¯c ¯xed e®ects and
contains a deterministic time trend and a squared deterministic time trend for each
experience group. The regressions for each education-experience group are based on
44 observations, the regressions in each education group on 176 observations, and the
overall regression on 704 observations. Within R2 are reported.
38Table 2: Impact of labor supply shocks on the capital-output ratio
dependent variable: ln·t OLS IV
ln·t¡1 0.745 ¤¤¤ 0.911 ¤¤¤
(0.165) (0.275)
ln·t¡2 -0.393 ¤¤¤ -0.500 ¤¤¤
(0.153) (0.211)
¢lnNt -0.692 ¤¤ -0.205
(0.278) (0.698)
observations 44 44
adjusted R2 0.66 0.64
Durbin-Watson statistics 1.54 1.73
ADF test for unit roots
constant constant and trend
t-statistic t-statistic lags
ln·t -3.89 ¤¤¤ -3.82 ¤¤¤ 1
lnNt 0.13 -2.49 1
¢lnNt -4.20 ¤¤¤ -4.25 ¤¤¤ 0
Notes: White-heteroscedasticity robust standard errors in parentheses. ¤¤¤, ¤¤, ¤ de-
note the 1%-, 5%-, and 10%-signi¯cance levels. Each regression includes a constant
and a logarithmic deterministic time trend.{ The Log Likelihood statistic of Chow-
breakpoint test for the year 1990 is 19.2, which rejects the Null of no statistical break
at the 1 percent level. We included therefore a dummy variable which has for all years
from 1991 onwards a value of 1 and of 0 otherwise.{ The Breusch-Godfrey test rejects
the Null of no serial correlation for the ¯rst-order autoregressive model, but does not
reject the Null for the second-order autoregressive model which is reported here.{ The
IV-regressions use the ¯rst and the second lag of the (log) population as an instru-
ment for the change in the labor force.{ The Augmented Dickey Fuller test results
for unit-roots applies the MacKinnon (1996) critical values. The lag length has been
determined by the Schwarz-information criterion.
39Table 3: Partial elasticity of native - foreign wages, 1=¾i
1980 - 2004 1984 - 1993
all workers weighted all workers weighted
1/¾i 1/¾i 1/¾i 1/¾i
all 0.060 *** 0.053 *** 0.073 *** -0.056 ***
(0.006) (0.003) (0.016) (0.007)
no vocational 0.084 *** 0.070 *** 0.076 *** -0.058 ***
(0.009) (0.008) (0.013) (0.013)
with vocational 0.048 *** 0.051 *** 0.049 *** -0.053 ***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.007) (0.008)
high school 0.046 *** 0.051 *** 0.077 -0.132 ***
(0.016) (0.014) (0.048) (0.034)
university 0.072 *** 0.012 0.114 * -0.022
(0.023) (0.023) (0.069) (0.063)
observations 800 800 320 320
F-test 17.08 9.29 4.27 5.67
p-value 0% 5% 37% 22%
Notes: White-heteroscedasticity robust standard errors in parentheses. ¤¤¤, ¤¤, ¤ de-
note the 1%-, 5%-, and 10%-signi¯cance levels. Dependent variable is ln(wijht=wijft),
i.e. the relative daily wage of native to foreign workers within the same education-
experience cell. The explanatory variable is the relative employment of native
and foreign workers within the same education-experience cell. All regressions in-
clude education-by-experience group ¯xed e®ects. Observations in speci¯cation 2 are
weighted by total employment in the cell. The F-statistic tests the Null hypothesis
that all coe±cients 1=¾i are identical across educational groups.
40Table 4: Partial wage elasticity across education-experience cells, 1=½
1980-2004 1984-1993
CES-weighted sum native and CES-weighted sum native and
labor composite foreign labor force labor composite foreign labor force
(using estimated ¾i) (¾i ! 1) (using estimated ¾i) (¾i ! 1)
lnLijt 0.031 ¤¤¤ 0.031 ¤¤¤ 0.064 ¤¤¤ 0.063 ¤¤¤
(0.006) (0.006) (0.016) (0.016)
obs. 800 800 320 320
Notes: White heteroscedasticity robust standard errors in parentheses. ¤¤¤, ¤¤, ¤ denote
the 1%-, 5%-, and 10%-signi¯cance levels. Dependent variable is lnwijt, i.e. the log
daily wage in each education-experience cell. The equation is estimated by 2SLS using
the log of employed native workers in the respective education-experience group as
an instrument for the variable lnLijt. All regressions include education by experience
¯xed e®ects and education by year ¯xed e®ects and time ¯xed e®ects.
Table 5: Partial wage elasticity across education cells, 1=±
1980-2004 1984-1993
CES-weighted sum native and CES-weighted sum native and
labor composite foreign labor force labor composite foreign labor force
(using estimated ½) (½ ! 1) (using estimated ½) (½ ! 1)
lnLit 0.152 ¤¤ 0.146 ¤¤ 0.308 0.299
(0.076) (0.072) (0.214) (0.202)
obs 100 100 40 40
Notes: White heteroscedasticity robust standard errors in parentheses. ¤¤¤, ¤¤, ¤
denote the 1%-, 5%-, and 10%-signi¯cance levels. Dependent variable is lnwit, i.e. the
log wage in each education cell. The equation is estimated by 2SLS using the log of
employed native workers in the respective education group as an instrument for the
variable lnLit. All regressions include ¯xed time e®ects, education group ¯xed e®ects
and education-speci¯c time trends.
41Table 6: Simulation of migration e®ects on wages and unemployment
short-run results long-run results
education unemployment unemployment
degree wages rate wages rate
wages: change in % at an immigration of 1%
unemployment rate: change in %-points
total labor force
all -0.10 0.07 0.00 0.01
no vocational -0.31 0.19 -0.23 0.03
vocational -0.04 0.02 0.07 0.00
high school -0.05 0.08 0.05 0.03
university -0.07 0.03 0.03 0.01
native labor force
all -0.04 0.02 0.07 -0.01
no vocational -0.13 0.07 -0.03 0.01
vocational -0.02 0.00 0.09 -0.02
high school -0.02 0.01 0.08 -0.02
university -0.02 0.01 0.08 -0.02
foreign labor force
all -0.71 0.42 -0.64 0.11
no vocational -0.87 0.54 -0.81 0.12
vocational -0.47 0.20 -0.37 0.10
high school -0.45 0.51 -0.36 0.23
university -0.70 0.28 -0.60 0.17
Notes: The short-run simulations are based on the short-run semi-elasticities of the
wage curve and consider the short-run impact of migration on the capital-output ratio.
The long-run results are based on the long-run elasticities of the wage curve and a con-
stant capital-output ratio. The e®ects have been calculated for natives and foreigners
at each education-experience level separately. Aggregate wage ¯gures are calculated by
weighting each cell with the income share, aggregate unemployment ¯gures by weight-
ing each cell with the share in the labor force.
42Table 7: Simulation of migration e®ects, 1980-2004 and 1983-1993
1980 - 2004 1984 - 1993
short-run results long-run results short-run results long-run results
education unempl. unempl. unempl. unempl.
degree wage rate wages rate wages rate wages rate
wages: change in %, unemployment rate: change in %-points
total labor force
all -0.42 0.07 0.00 0.05 -0.50 0.39 0.00 0.14
no vocational 1.12 -0.83 1.63 -0.31 -0.90 0.84 -0.57 0.18
vocational -0.65 0.29 -0.25 0.13 -0.32 0.36 0.17 0.11
high school -4.83 3.79 -4.65 2.59 -2.97 -3.73 -1.03 -0.16
university -1.60 0.62 -1.22 0.37 -0.46 0.32 0.07 0.19
native labor force
all -0.22 0.05 0.19 -0.03 -0.21 0.12 0.29 -0.13
no vocational 0.75 -0.27 1.23 -0.18 -0.43 0.54 -0.08 0.06
vocational -0.33 0.10 0.07 -0.01 -0.13 0.06 0.36 -0.17
high school -3.19 1.76 -2.97 0.92 -2.18 -1.17 -0.47 -0.41
university -0.67 0.22 -0.28 0.07 0.02 0.02 0.54 -0.18
foreign labor force
all -2.30 -0.09 -1.83 0.25 -3.93 1.56 -3.45 1.42
no vocational 2.23 -3.30 2.83 -0.99 -2.48 2.23 -2.21 1.10
vocational -6.84 0.88 -6.49 0.39 -4.37 1.91 -3.91 1.58
high school -32.00 3.14 -32.48 1.18 -16.44 -21.72 -10.50 -1.01
university -13.61 1.86 -13.35 1.14 -7.88 1.42 -7.21 1.95
Notes: The short-run simulations are based on the short-run semi-elasticities of the
wage curve and consider the short-run impact of migration on the capital-output ratio.
The long-run results are based on the long-run elasticities of the wage curve and a con-
stant capital-output ratio. The e®ects have been calculated for natives and foreigners
at each education-experience level and then aggregated.
43Table A1: Ethnic German labor force as a percentage of total labor
force (Western Germany, 1980 - 2004)
year arrivals stock year arrivals stock year arrivals stock
1980 0.08 0.24 1990 0.59 1.78 2000 0.03 3.23
1981 0.06 0.29 1991 0.41 2.06 2001 0.02 3.23
1982 0.03 0.29 1992 0.32 2.24 2002 0.01 3.20
1983 0.04 0.32 1993 0.39 2.46 2003 0.00 3.21
1984 0.04 0.35 1994 0.26 2.47 2004 0.00 3.20
1985 0.06 0.40 1995 0.30 2.71
1986 0.06 0.44 1996 0.21 2.84
1987 0.11 0.53 1997 0.20 3.02
1988 0.33 0.84 1998 0.11 3.09
1989 0.56 1.33 1999 0.08 3.21
Source: Authors' calculations based on the IABS.
Table A2: Description of dataset (Western Germany, 1980 - 2004)
1980 - 2004 1984 - 1993
observations percent observations percent
all spells 11,769,872 100.0 4460654 100.0
minus part time workers / trainees 2,543,869 21.6 783808 17.6
minus age (below 15 and above 60) 166,262 1.4 56664 1.3
minus missing nationality 1098 0.0 216 0.0
minus missing education 183070 1.6 68,847 1.5
minus wages below social 81712 0.7 15,031 0.3
security contribution threshold
total 8,793,861 74.7 3,536,088 79.3
Source: Authors' calculations based on the IABS.
Table A3: Change of foreign labor force by education
change in percent of
total labor force foreign labor force
educational degree 1980-2004 1984-1993 1980-2004 1984-1993
all 4.14 4.94 41 57
no vocational -6.13 6.54 -26 30
vocational 6.79 4.35 134 91
high school 38.75 9.47 597 159
university 12.52 4.37 176 71
Source: Authors' calculations based on the IABS.
44Table A4: Share of foreigners by education and experience
education experience 1980 1984 1985 1990 1993 1995 2000 2004
no vocational 0-5 0.177 0.151 0.136 0.249 0.368 0.305 0.175 0.122
6-10 0.275 0.180 0.189 0.223 0.349 0.393 0.315 0.202
11-15 0.379 0.286 0.267 0.304 0.370 0.389 0.457 0.396
16-20 0.458 0.351 0.340 0.350 0.402 0.421 0.415 0.473
21-25 0.344 0.402 0.408 0.376 0.427 0.434 0.428 0.435
26-30 0.227 0.261 0.291 0.410 0.420 0.436 0.442 0.428
31-35 0.176 0.185 0.196 0.292 0.391 0.427 0.436 0.451
36-40 0.081 0.117 0.128 0.181 0.224 0.253 0.383 0.451
all 0.240 0.219 0.224 0.279 0.346 0.370 0.395 0.388
vocational 0-5 0.030 0.026 0.027 0.049 0.095 0.122 0.095 0.062
6-10 0.043 0.034 0.034 0.049 0.067 0.083 0.138 0.104
11-15 0.074 0.052 0.052 0.065 0.078 0.081 0.106 0.154
16-20 0.090 0.078 0.074 0.080 0.094 0.095 0.097 0.111
21-25 0.057 0.078 0.084 0.088 0.095 0.103 0.107 0.108
26-30 0.049 0.047 0.052 0.088 0.102 0.102 0.112 0.111
31-35 0.037 0.044 0.046 0.054 0.074 0.092 0.110 0.116
36-40 0.021 0.029 0.032 0.045 0.051 0.054 0.084 0.112
all 0.051 0.048 0.049 0.064 0.080 0.088 0.106 0.113
high school 0-5 0.040 0.019 0.021 0.021 0.034 0.051 0.065 0.049
6-10 0.082 0.044 0.035 0.037 0.035 0.039 0.069 0.074
11-15 0.118 0.098 0.086 0.058 0.057 0.050 0.056 0.077
16-20 0.076 0.112 0.127 0.111 0.090 0.077 0.071 0.069
21-25 0.083 0.090 0.085 0.151 0.146 0.126 0.090 0.081
26-30 0.064 0.075 0.083 0.083 0.123 0.156 0.145 0.110
31-35 0.030 0.061 0.064 0.074 0.086 0.097 0.163 0.148
36-40 0.019 0.031 0.035 0.076 0.074 0.075 0.088 0.140
all 0.065 0.059 0.057 0.058 0.063 0.066 0.078 0.082
university 0-5 0.060 0.033 0.031 0.045 0.048 0.054 0.093 0.113
6-10 0.084 0.052 0.045 0.041 0.050 0.046 0.044 0.082
11-15 0.088 0.081 0.072 0.058 0.052 0.050 0.049 0.055
16-20 0.078 0.081 0.083 0.087 0.074 0.067 0.058 0.057
21-25 0.060 0.077 0.078 0.084 0.099 0.096 0.072 0.062
26-30 0.050 0.054 0.055 0.076 0.075 0.085 0.100 0.078
31-35 0.048 0.047 0.045 0.057 0.075 0.077 0.082 0.104
36-40 0.025 0.028 0.049 0.042 0.045 0.049 0.047 0.062
all 0.071 0.062 0.059 0.061 0.063 0.063 0.063 0.071
Notes: Individuals included in the sample are between 15 and 60 years old and are
either employed or unemployed on September 30 of the respective year.
45Table A5: Daily wages of native workers by education and experience
(constant 2000 Euros)
education experience 1980 1984 1985 1990 1993 1995 2000 2004
no vocational 0-5 41 39 41 44 46 45 43 45
6-10 55 54 54 57 59 60 57 58
11-15 60 61 62 64 67 68 73 69
16-20 62 62 64 68 70 70 76 78
21-25 64 65 65 67 71 72 75 80
26-30 64 66 67 69 70 71 78 77
31-35 64 65 67 70 72 71 76 80
36-40 63 65 66 70 71 72 77 76
all 60 61 62 65 68 69 71 72
vocational 0-5 49 48 49 53 56 56 58 59
6-10 63 61 62 65 66 66 68 67
11-15 72 72 72 74 76 76 79 78
16-20 79 79 80 81 81 82 86 86
21-25 81 84 85 86 86 86 89 90
26-30 81 85 87 90 89 89 93 93
31-35 81 84 87 92 93 93 96 96
36-40 80 85 86 91 93 94 100 98
all 73 74 75 78 81 81 86 87
high school 0-5 58 57 57 61 64 65 68 68
6-10 78 75 75 78 82 81 85 85
11-15 92 93 94 93 95 95 104 102
16-20 105 103 104 104 104 104 112 114
21-25 111 114 114 109 109 109 114 115
26-30 112 119 120 118 114 112 119 119
31-35 117 126 126 120 123 120 125 121
36-40 111 127 131 128 122 119 130 120
all 90 89 88 87 91 91 101 103
university 0-5 87 92 92 94 96 93 105 95
6-10 110 119 118 121 125 122 141 138
11-15 129 141 144 137 144 144 160 168
16-20 139 160 159 156 154 153 175 180
21-25 143 166 166 166 168 166 181 186
26-30 143 171 173 170 174 175 195 188
31-35 139 171 170 177 179 177 204 199
36-40 127 154 164 169 171 171 207 187
all 123 140 141 140 144 144 164 168
Notes: Individuals included in the sample are between 15 and 60 years old, receive
non-zero income and work at least on September 30 of the respective year. Wages are
calculated in real Euro using the GDP de°ator (base year: 2000). Wages above the
social security ceiling are imputed.
46Table A6: Daily wages of foreign workers by education and experience
(constant 2000 Euros)
education experience 1980 1984 1985 1990 1993 1995 2000 2004
no vocational 0-5 47 47 47 50 46 46 44 43
6-10 58 56 57 59 56 55 55 53
11-15 61 61 63 64 61 60 62 62
16-20 65 63 64 66 63 64 65 66
21-25 67 66 68 67 65 65 68 70
26-30 67 67 68 71 67 66 68 70
31-35 65 65 67 72 71 71 70 71
36-40 64 64 65 70 70 70 74 74
all 63 62 64 67 64 64 66 68
vocational 0-5 54 51 52 55 55 57 59 57
6-10 63 61 62 65 62 63 67 67
11-15 70 68 68 70 68 68 71 75
16-20 74 73 75 73 70 71 74 75
21-25 75 76 77 78 73 73 76 78
26-30 74 76 77 81 78 77 76 78
31-35 72 73 75 81 80 80 80 78
36-40 71 73 75 77 79 80 84 82
all 70 71 72 74 71 71 74 76
high school 0-5 63 64 62 65 61 56 65 65
6-10 75 74 79 79 74 73 81 78
11-15 78 78 76 92 82 81 87 90
16-20 103 96 96 86 86 78 89 89
21-25 92 103 108 97 78 85 86 88
26-30 97 82 86 103 100 93 86 91
31-35 102 99 141 90 93 86 101 85
36-40 106 127 91 114 85 86 95 113
all 84 86 89 89 81 79 85 87
university 0-5 97 107 119 109 102 105 115 107
6-10 114 127 135 124 140 132 135 141
11-15 141 140 190 150 143 144 151 147
16-20 135 157 172 153 152 157 149 164
21-25 132 162 173 166 165 163 155 153
26-30 138 149 167 175 162 189 151 173
31-35 159 151 158 166 172 165 177 166
36-40 134 191 147 149 185 151 175 212
all 126 144 164 150 150 151 147 151
Notes: Individuals included in the sample are between 15 and 60 years old, receive
non-zero income and work at least on September 30 of the respective year. Wages are
calculated in real Euro using the GDP de°ator (base year: 2000). Wages above the
social security ceiling are imputed.
47Table A7: The wage-setting curve: IV-estimation results, 1984 - 1993
lnwij;t¡1 lnuijt
education short-run long-run
degree coe®. se coe®. se coe®. se R2
all experience groups
all 0.236 (0.048) *** -0.100 (0.015) *** -0.130 (0.024) *** 0.84
no vocational 0.245 (0.134) * -0.091 (0.013) *** -0.121 (0.025) *** 0.95
vocational 0.371 (0.084) *** -0.089 (0.010) *** -0.141 (0.028) *** 0.97
high school -0.095 (0.147) 0.029 (0.040) 0.026 (0.035) 0.80
university 0.245 (0.066) *** -0.118 (0.025) *** -0.157 (0.041) *** 0.69
experience group 1 and 2
no vocational 0.677 (0.353) * -0.096 (0.026) *** -0.296 (0.343) 0.94
vocational 0.780 (0.294) *** -0.096 (0.023) *** -0.434 (0.625) 0.97
high school 0.430 (0.296) -0.052 (0.023) ** -0.092 (0.074) 0.98
university 0.189 (0.112) * -0.108 (0.023) *** -0.133 (0.038) *** 0.91
experience group 3 and 4
no vocational -0.100 (0.219) -0.101 (0.021) *** -0.092 (0.019) *** 0.97
vocational 0.118 (0.160) -0.091 (0.018) *** -0.103 (0.026) *** 0.94
high school 0.141 (0.490) -0.249 (0.451) -0.290 (0.543) -
university 0.525 (0.290) * -0.250 (0.177) -0.526 (0.646) -
experience group 5 and 6
no vocational 0.119 (0.288) -0.088 (0.037) ** -0.100 (0.049) ** 0.87
vocational 0.301 (0.116) *** -0.080 (0.016) *** -0.115 (0.034) *** 0.91
high school 0.024 (0.356) 0.009 (0.080) 0.009 (0.080) 0.80
university 0.092 (0.108) -0.028 (0.032) -0.031 (0.037) 0.38
experience group 7 and 8
no vocational 0.067 (0.151) -0.081 (0.011) *** -0.087 (0.016) *** 0.99
vocational 0.356 (0.130) *** -0.082 (0.015) *** -0.127 (0.039) *** 0.98
high school -0.460 (0.318) 0.122 (0.084) -0.524 (0.046) * 0.59
university 0.169 (0.159) -0.145 (0.057) *** -0.175 (0.080) ** 0.64
Notes: Dependent variable is lnwijt, i.e. the log wage in each education-experience
group. White-heteroscedasticity robust standard errors in parentheses. ¤¤¤, ¤¤, ¤ de-
note the 1%-, 5%-, and 10%-signi¯cance levels. The model is estimated by 2SLS. The
unemployment rate is instrumented by its ¯rst, second and third lag. The model is
speci¯ed as a one-way error component model with group speci¯c ¯xed e®ects and
contains a deterministic time trend and a squared deterministic time trend for each
experience group. The regressions for each education-experience group are based on
44 observations, the regressions in each education group on 176 observations, and the
overall regression on 704 observations. Within R2 are reported.
48Table A8: The wage-setting curve: GMM-estimation results¤
education lnwij;t¡1 lnuijt Wald- obs.
short-run long-run Â2(3)-stat.
1980 - 2004
all 1 0.623 *** -0.034 *** -0.090 *** 413354 736
(0.002) (0.001) (0.003)
no vocational 2 0.606 *** -0.044 ** -0.111 28 184
(0.228) (0.019) (0.080)
vocational 3 0.743 *** -0.041 *** -0.161 *** 184 184
(0.086) (0.010) (0.059)
high school 4 0.644 *** -0.044 *** -0.122 * 46 184
(0.188) (0.007) (0.071)
university 5 0.668 *** -0.028 -0.084 39 184
(0.183) (0.032) (0.070)
1984-1993
all 6 0.448 *** -0.044 *** -0.080 *** 55212 320
(0.005) (0.001) (0.002)
no vocational 7 0.369 *** -0.050 *** -0.079 *** 523 80
(0.096) (0.006) (0.020)
vocational 8 0.722 *** -0.048 *** -0.174 *** 343 80
(0.063) (0.009) (0.055)
high school 9 -1.200 -0.041 ** -0.018 ** 75 80
(0.966) (0.020) (0.016)
university 10 0.441 *** -0.032 -0.058 244 80
(0.038) (0.021) (0.040)
Notes: The dependent variable is lnwijt. ¤ Arellano-Bond (1992) two-step estima-
tion. 1 The Sargan-Â2(276)-test statistics rejects the H0 of no over-identi¯cation with
31.7¤¤¤. The Arellano-Bond z-statistics rejects the H0 of AR(1) at -3.3¤¤¤, and of AR(2)
at 0.7. 2 Sargan-Â2(156)-test statistics: 5.9¤¤¤. Arellano-Bond z-statistics: AR(1) -
1.2, AR(2) 0.8. 3 Sargan-Â2(155)-test statistics: 6.6¤¤¤. Arellano-Bond z-statistics:
AR(1) -2.1¤¤, AR(2) -2.0¤¤. 4 Sargan-Â2(156)-test statistics: 6.0¤¤¤. Arellano-Bond z-
statistics: AR(1) -2.0¤¤, AR(2) 0.02. 5 Sargan-Â2(155)-test statistics: 7.7¤¤¤. Arellano-
Bond z-statistics: AR(1) -2.2¤¤, AR(2) 0.7. 6 Sargan-Â1(75)-test statistics: 31.9¤¤¤.
Arellano-Bond z-statistics: AR(1) -2.9¤¤¤, AR(2) 0.04. 7 Sargan-Â2(65)-test statis-
tics: 7.6¤¤¤. Arellano-Bond z-statistics: AR(1) -0.7, AR(2) -1.3. 8 Sargan-Â2(64)-test
statistics: 7.6¤¤¤. Arellano-Bond z-statistics: AR(1) -2.1¤¤, AR(2) -2.1¤¤. 9 Sargan-
Â2(65)-test statistics 1.9¤¤¤. Arellano-Bond z-statistics: AR(1) 1.3, AR(2) -0.6. 10
Sargan-Â2(64)-test statistics 7.7¤¤¤. Arellano-Bond z-statistics AR(1) -2.1¤¤, AR(2)
0.2. GMM two-step standard errors are biased.
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